A novel diagnosis method is proposed in this paper that uses the results of the blended HAZID analysis extended to the dynamic case of process systems controlled by operational procedures. The algorithm is capable of finding fault root causes in process systems using nominal and observed possible faulty operational procedure execution traces. The algorithm uses the structural decomposition of the process system and its component-level dynamic HAZID (P-HAZID) tables and executes the diagnosis component-wise by first decomposing the observed execution traces, and then assembling the diagnosis results. The exact structure of the algorithm is also discussed, followed by two case studies on which its operation is demonstrated.
Introduction
Loss prevention in process systems is a task of crucial importance in avoiding fatal accidents and plant breakdowns. An important cornerstone of preventing losses is the early mitigation and isolation of faults which can be achieved by applying various fault detection procedures to the system. Because of its vital importance, the literature of various diagnostic approaches is enormously wide, but the model-based methods for fault detection and isolation are the most widespread.
Depending on the a priori and measured information that is available for diagnosis, the fault diagnostic approaches for process systems are categorized into quantitative, qualitative and process history based approaches in [15] . Modelbased qualitative diagnostic approaches, to which our method also belongs, apply approximate "qualitative" information for both the models and the measured signatures or symptoms.
Hazard identification has been long taken as an independent activity from diagnosis, but the information they built on has a lot of common elements.
The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability, see [4] ) and FMEA (Failure Effect and Mode Analysis, see [5] ) are two fundamentally different analysis methods for hazard identification, where HAZOP is deviation-driven and FMEA is process component-driven. Due to the complexity of real process systems, the timeconsuming and error-prone manual construction of HAZOP and FMEA tables has been identified as a major bottleneck in hazard identification of process systems. Fortunately, there have been results for automated generation of them (for HAZOP, in [15] together with a concrete application in [14] ). Another possible way is to use qualitative models in such an analysis (again, for HAZOP, see [6] with a batch process system application in [10] ). An attempt to unite the two different diagnostic information stored in HAZOP and FMEA analysis results, called the blended HAZID methodology was described in [9] together with its use for process system diagnosis tasks.
The domain for the usual HAZID analysis is static in the sense, that devi-ations from the normal, usually steady-state operation are recorded and used. It is, however, possible to extend the blended HAZID diagnostic idea to the dynamic case, when the execution of an operational procedure drives the process system from one state to another, and use it for diagnostic purposes. This method can be used for finding component faults based on the deviation(s) between the observable inputs and outputs of planned (nominal) and actual (characteristic) event sequences driven by an operational procedure. In order to achieve this, the method uses a novel dynamic procedure HAZID (P-HAZID) information as described in [16] . The use of these P-HAZID tables for diagnostic purposes had been formalized in [12] , and it had been extended by taking the structural similarities of process system components into account in [13] .
The aim of this paper is to describe a diagnostic approach based on the P-HAZID methodology which can be used effectively for process systems. By decomposing the process system into smaller and individually better diagnosable components, the inevitable combinatorial explosion associated with the amount of diagnostic information can be managed better. For this purpose, a similar object-oriented process system topology modeling approach was used as in [8] , but here the decomposed diagnostic reasoning is developed and utilized.
In the first part of the paper, the basic notions of operational procedural diagnosis, and the single-component diagnostic procedure is described. Based on these fundamental concepts, the second part discusses the idea of structural decomposition in process systems based on P-HAZID information and how a research prototype for the idea was implemented. Finally, in the third part the operation of the algorithm is shown on two simple case studies.
The blended HAZID approach and its extension to event sequences
In this section the basic notions are developed for use later in the article during the description of the algorithm. These are the same notions used in [13] .
Blended HAZID ([9])
The blended HAZID approach (BLHAZID, described thoroughly in [9] ) combines the system-driven HAZOP and the component-driven FMEA into one methodology, attempting to minimize their weaknesses and utilize their strengths at the same time. Unlike the original HAZOP and FMEA, three main steps in the initial analysis are needed (based on [9] ):
• Decompose the system into subsystems -the analysis is done in subsystem level onwards.
• Find deviations from intended functions, with their causes and implications.
• Elicit the causes and effects of each fault per component in every subsystem on the function of the system.
As a result of the analysis, a cause-implication directed graph (see [9] for an example) can be drawn for each identified failure to visualize casual relationships between failures and components. The nodes in this graph are either components or functional failures and each edge represents a causal relationship between them. This graph is a powerful visualization tool for plant operators.
The table used for diagnosis (described in section 2.3) is analogous to this graph, however, it describes causal relationships between operational procedure deviations and failure root causes.
Diagnostics based on event sequences
Qualitative range spaces. Current values of real-valued scalar outputs in process systems can be described using a properly selected qualitative range space. For example, to describe the value of a level sensor in a tank, the following range space can be used:
Here 0 means an empty tank, L, N and H means low, normal and high fluid level respectively, while e− and e+ refer to unmeasurably low and high fluid levels (this might mean a failure in the level sensor itself). This range space will be used to describe system outputs during operation.
Similarly, binary-valued valve actuator states can be described using the following range space (an extended qualitative range space, such as Q e , for example, can also be used for the input values in the general case):
Here cl means a closed state, while op means an open state.
Traces. Operational procedures in process systems can be seen as detailed lists of instructions for the plant operator personnel to perform certain operations on the plant. Procedures can be formally described using finite inputoutput event sequences where a single event describes a state of the inputs and outputs of the system at a specific time instant. Therefore the syntax of a an input-output event (at time instant t of an n-input m output system) is the following:
event t = (t; input 1 , ..., input n ; output 1 , ..., output m ) . Sequences formed from these events are called traces and defined as:
Separate events in the same trace always contain the same inputs and outputs. The following types of chronological deviations are used:
• never-happened: When the particular event never happened in the characteristic trace.
• later: When the event happened in the characteristic trace, but at a later time instant.
• earlier: When the event happened in the characteristic trace, but at an earlier time instant.
The following types of quantitative deviations are used:
• greater: When a particular output's qualitative value (see Q e in (1)) was higher in the characteristic event that of the nominal one.
• smaller: When a particular output's qualitative value was lower in the characteristic event.
For example, the chronological deviation earlier(3;op,cl;N) "means" that the third nominal event, where the inputs were "open" and "closed" and the output value was "normal" happened at an earlier time instant in the characteristic trace. As an other example, the deviation smaller(4;op,op;N) denotes that at the fourth characteristic event the value of the output was smaller than the nominal.
The P-HAZID table ([16])
As a combination and extension of the widely used FMEA and HAZOP analyses (for details, refer to [12] or [7] and partly [11] ), the procedure HAZID (abbreviated as P-HAZID) analysis result can be used for fault diagnosis during operational procedures in a given process system. The result of this P-HAZID analysis is given in the form of a table, and it consists of deviations leading to possible root causes ordered in columns. Using the initial set of differences 
Simple diagnosis based on the P-HAZID table ([12], [13])
Using a nominal operational procedure with its corresponding P-HAZID table and a possibly faulty characteristics trace the diagnostic algorithm operates as follows: 1. All deviations are collected between the nominal and characteristic traces.
The deviations at the final and preceding time instant are calculated, and assigned to the set of final deviation pairs by increasing order in the time instant. The next step is executed for each final deviation pair.
2. All the rows in the P-HAZID table are selected where exactly the first element of the pair is found in the Deviation column, and exactly the second element is found in the Implication column. This diagnostic algorithm attempts to construct a set of reasoning trees in the P-HAZID table (rows are represented as nodes) using the method mentioned above from the set of initial deviations. The roots of the tree are the final deviation pairs from where the diagnostic procedure is initiated, while the leaves are the identified root causes or the deviations from which the diagnosis cannot proceed forward (because they were not contained in the set of initial deviations). The junctions (nodes with degree more than 2) denote rows in the P-HAZID table which are connected to multiple rows in the P-HAZID by their event values in the Deviation and Implication columns. If the diagnosis cannot proceed forward from a deviation because it was missing from the set of initial deviations, this might mean a failure in the P-HAZID table (thus the algorithm might be used for validating the P-HAZID table).
Such a reasoning tree can be found for the P-HAZID table of Table 1 and the set of deviations:
• smaller(2;op,cl;N)
• smaller(3;op,cl;N)
• smaller(4;op,cl;N)
In this case -due to the negative bias of the level sensor -the leak of the tank and the negative bias fault of the sensor cannot be distinguished by the algorithm, so both are added to the set of found root causes.
Diagnosis using structural decomposition
Using the already discussed method of simple diagnosis, root causes can in principle be found, but in the case of complex process systems creating an appropriate P-HAZID table might be a laborious and highly complex task. Because most process systems are constructed from similar elements (e.g. tanks, pipes, valves), called components, the diagnostic task can also be decomposed accordingly, and then performed using component-level diagnosis. In this case only the component level P-HAZID tables and nominal trace need to be constructed, which is a more simple task compared to assembling the global P-HAZID table and nominal traces. This is the basis of the structural diagnostic procedure proposed in this paper.
Components
A component in the diagnostic system consists of a component-specific P-HAZID table, a nominal trace, a start condition and a transformation function. All components are instances of specific equipment classes (eg. tank, pipe, valve), process systems are built from them in an object-oriented manner as in [10] . That means that similar parts (eg. tanks) in process systems can use the same P-HAZID information (tables) and nominal traces, in that way decreasing the redundancy in the diagnostic system.
The majority of the diagnostic information (equipment specific P-HAZID table and nominal trace part) belongs to the equipment class, so it can be reused among similar components in the system (with the same physical behavior and role in the system-level operation procedure). Component instances shall only contain their own input/output transformation function (to convert the systemlevel input and output names to the ones "locally" used in the equipment specific P-HAZID table and nominal trace) and start-condition (to stop the diagnostic procedure if a system is in a state which makes the component diagnosis obsolete -for example due to a severe fault in an other component).
Breaking the complete P-HAZID along components
Based on the system's structure and the events in the system-level P-HAZID table it is possible to break the system up into individual components connected by boundary elements (valves or pipes). Note that an operational procedure usually deals with one part of the system at a time, these parts can be identified from the nominal trace and can be converted into components with inputs (using the boundary elements of the parts) and measurable internal states or outputs.
Setting up the component graph
Based on the physical characteristic of the system and the system-level nominal trace, components can be identified in the system and the connection be- For example, considering the process system depicted in Figure 2 , and the operational procedure in Table 2 (which fills up all the three tanks with liquid and then opens up the output valves), the simple component graph is seen on the bottom part of the figure.
Distributing trace fragments among components
From the nominal trace the start component can always be determined. The simple nominal trace in Table 2 Figure 3 ) the same trace fragments are distributed among the parallelly connected components (in that case some of the components might get events from the same system-level event but with different inputs and outputs).
Component based diagnosis
Given a system-level characteristic trace and a system broken up into separate components, the component-level diagnosis uses the original single component diagnostic idea to search for potential failures or root causes. First the trace is sliced and distributed among separate components of the system along the possible component paths as described in section 3.4. In this step, all inputs and outputs in the original trace are also transformed to inputs and outputs local to the component by using the component's transformation function.
After that, the algorithm takes all the component paths and calculates the last component where the start condition is not fulfilled (based on the appropriate preceding event in the characteristic trace), then at this component the path is truncated (so that components does not get diagnosed in vain). It is also possible that all start conditions are fulfilled, in this case no truncation is done.
Algorithm
The complete diagnostic algorithm takes an already decomposed system and a system-level characteristic trace as an input and outputs the diagnosed root causes per component and the start component failures (if there were any). The execution has the following major steps:
1. The characteristic trace is decomposed by components and its fragments are distributed based on the decomposition of the system. This step, described in Section 3.4 in detail, takes the whole characteristic trace as an input and outputs a sequence of pairs of components and corresponding trace fragments.
2. Based on the component pair sequences of the preceding step and the structure of the system, all possible component paths are created and trimmed adequately based on their start conditions as described in Section 3.5.
3. The single component diagnostic procedure described in Section 2.4 is executed for all valid (non-trimmed) components in every component path (local deviations are determined and based on them the reasoning procedure is initiated on the local P-HAZID table). The diagnosed root causes, and the set of terminal deviations (from which the diagnosis cannot proceed forward) are collected per component.
4. The algorithm outputs the root causes, terminal deviations and the list of components which were not diagnosed due to start condition failures.
As its single component equivalent, this component-based diagnosis also has P-HAZID Based on this, the major components of the algorithm and the connections between them can be seen in Figure 1 .
The algorithm had been implemented in Scala [2], which is an object oriented functional language with very similar syntax to Java [1] . Only the core parts of the algorithm were developed in a "proof of concept" manner, and they were just executed by a properly configured unit test environment (using [3]) to demonstrate the functionality.
Case studies
In this section the operation of the algorithm is demonstrated in two simple process systems both consist of similar tanks connected with pipes and valves.
In both cases the identified components in the process systems are these tanks.
A simple serial case study
The first case study is a serially connected process system of three similar tanks (seen in Figure 2 ) and a simple operational procedure to fill up all three tanks (TA, TB and TC), described in Table 2 in detail. The first three events of the operational procedure relate to tank TA, the events from the third to the fifth relate to the tank TB, while the last three events relate to tank TC (the Table 2 .
At the beginning of the procedure the input valve is opened, and after the tank fills, its output valve is opened. Finally the output valve is opened on the last tank so that the fluid might exit the system. The considered fault in this case is the rupture of the second tank, which is preventing it from containing, so the sensor never shows any fluid inside the tank. The faulty trace is described in Table 3 .
The diagnostic algorithm identified one single component path of the system starting from the first tank TA, and assigned fragments of the input trace (with aligned time) to each of them (this can be also seen in Figure 2 ). This assignment was done in a serial manner, so every component got a different part from the trace, apart from the boundary events which were distributed to neighboring In this case the algorithm could correctly identify the leak during the diagnosis of TB also using the P-HAZID table in Table 1 (but instantiated in three copies for the three tanks as components, respectively) from the following deviation set:
• smaller(2;op,cl;L)
• smaller(3;op,op;N)
• never-happened(2;op,cl;L)
• never-happened(3;op,op;N)
Here the first and second input refer to the input and output valve, respectively, and the only output is the level of the tank.
Due to the small resolution of the sensor, a later and a smaller deviation was also found, because the algorithm started to reason on the path to the "negative level sensor bias" in the table (but could not proceed with this because these deviations were not found in the list of deviations). 
A simple parallel case study
In the second case study the algorithm execution is demonstrated on a parallel process system, here fluid is fed into a bigger aggregator tank and then it is distributed into two smaller tanks, where it leaves the system through the two outputs at the bottom of the tanks. The objective of the operational procedure is similar to the one in the previous case, namely to fill up all three tanks with
liquid and then open the outputs. The aggregator tank's dimensions are different, because the input valve's diameter is increased, so that it can fill up twice as fast as the other tanks, and it has two output valves leading to the other two tank components. The nominal trace of the system is given in Table 4 .
In this example scenario we added to both output tanks simulated failures:
TB had a positive sensor bias failure, while TC had a rupture. ing faulty trace is given in Table 5 . Due to the parallel nature of the system, these failures shall be diagnosed separately, they are independent of each other.
Because of the parallel nature of the components, the algorithm found two different component paths in this scenario (see at the bottom of Figure 3 ) using the aggregator tank, TA, as a starting component. It should also be noted that in contrast with the serial process system, TB and TC got the same event fragments here (only with different inputs and outputs).
After executing the diagnostic algorithm, the following root causes were found:
• For Tank TB. Here the positive bias failure could be identified, this is the only root cause or deviation which had been found as a result of diagnosing this component.
• For Tank TC. Here -just like in the case of the first case study -the tank leak failure could be identified, along with a false report of a negative bias failure -this was diagnosed due to the simplicity of the P-HAZID Table 5 : A faulty trace of the operational procedure for the parallel process system ( Figure   3 ) for a positive level sensor bias fault in tank TB and a tank rupture in tank TC.
Conclusion and Further work
A novel diagnosis method was described in this paper that uses the component- A structural decomposition of the process system and its diagnostic components, similar to the ones in [8] were used for the diagnosis, but in our work the decomposed operational procedure is executed on the results of the structural decomposition, while in [8] the physical connections and fault propagation through them were emphasized.
Two simple case study demonstrated the operation of the diagnostic algorithm and its effect to decrease the redundancy in a complex process system with similar components. The capability of the method for identifying multiple faults has also been demonstrated.
Two possible directions for further work have been identified. Firstly, an on-line version of the diagnostic procedure is aimed at. Currently the algorithm is working on off-line data, i.e. it is assumed that the diagnosable operational procedure had been completed before. Extending the algorithm with capabilities to support run-time operational procedure events (to diagnose them under execution, and process events as they happen) might add a considerable benefit to the use cases of the diagnostic method. In that way, fault detection could be faster, operational procedure execution could be halted in order to enable plant personnel to begin possible fault mitigation operations before the procedure had been finished.
The other possible further research direction targets the refinement of the P-HAZID tables for improved diagnostic resolution. With a slight modification, arbitrary P-HAZID tables can be validated by the single-component reasoning part by using it to explore all possible reasoning paths in the 
